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ifa Input 
 A Future for the Chinese Diaspora and Australia 
       Great Story and the Golden Rule 
 ifa Input 02/2021 
 
Chenjun Wang and Naren Chitty 
Chinese in Australia have grown into a variegated diaspora with a mainland-born majority. Diasporas 
are channels of cultural, economic and political influence; and seen as such by sending and receiving 
countries. They interact in international cultural relations between sending and receiving countries, as 
expressions of civic virtue oriented to either or both. Cooperative interactions between the respective 
countries can bring prosperity to all; but when security considerations cast clouds over relations be-
tween countries, the concerned countries and communities have careful paths to tread. This input vis-
its the Chinese diaspora past and present. It emphasises the rules of friendship and hospitality as 
guiding principles for healthy international cultural relations. 
Introduction 
 
The Chinese diaspora in Australia is situated at 
the intersection of migration and domestic social 
policy (cultural, economic and political) that has 
shaped international cultural relations over a 
century. A definition of cultural relations clarifies 
how diaspora, migration and domestic social pol-
icies are akin to international cultural relations. 
Richard Arndt (2005: 43) views cultural relations 
(distinct from cultural diplomacy) as “literally 
the relations between national cultures, those as-
pects of intellect and education lodged in any so-
ciety that tend to cross borders and connect with 
foreign institutions”; such relations can happen 
autonomously of state programmes. This defini-
tion includes international cultural relations, di-
asporas being channels for relations between na-
tional cultures. Members of diasporic communi-
ties carry economic values and national identities 
to their new lands. 
 
An issue that has arisen after 9/11, that is per-
tinent to migration, has been the porosity of bor-
ders to values inconsistent with those of Austral-
ian society. Culture and influence sits on the 
centre of the debate among the public and gov-
ernment. Cross-border social and news media, 
institutions, and agents compound this porosity. 
One category of diaspora members, international 
students, are sojourners or would-be migrants. 
Chinese students accounted for 37.3% of total in-
ternational students in Australia, and for over 17 
percent of total revenue for nine leading univer-
sities (Babones 2019). They have also contributed 
additional revenue in sectors such as tourism and 
housing. 
 
Diasporas are more than migrant clusters. The 
270 Chinese in Australia in 1845-49 were not a di-
aspora in today’s sense (Australia Bureau of Sta-
tistics 2012). The White Australia Policy was a re-
sponse to labour competition by Chinese sojourn-
ers during the Gold Rush in the then Australian 
colony of Victoria (mid-19th century). The clos-
ing of Australia to non-European migrants sty-
mied growth of a Chinese diaspora. It was Multi-
culturalism Policy that later facilitated Australia’s 
opening-up to Asian migration, and the late-20th 
century burgeoning of a Chinese diaspora. Dias-
poras are “networks comprised of transnational 
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communities’ often engaged in the politics and 
social dynamics of remembrance and commemo-
ration” (Barker 2004: 51). Many members, stu-
dents included, are keen to support their commu-
nities in the new land and old country. This reso-
nates with diaspora policies of sending countries 
as recounted below. Diaspora members identify 
with either sending or receiving nations – or 
both. Additionally, both sides consider a dias-
pora to belong to them, and as a natural channel 
of influence with the other side. For these rea-
sons, diaspora members are important actors in 
international cultural relations. Policy environ-
ments, including bilaterally contentious ones, 
shape diasporic cultural relations. 
 
What motivates diaspora members to engage 
in international cultural relations between the 
two countries? Naren Chitty’s (2019; 2017a; 
2017b) civic virtue model, that posits multiple 
prompts for civic behaviour – virtue, rules, na-
tionalness, expedience, or combinations – is dis-
cussed in the second section. Such activities by 
diaspora members draw varied responses from 
the larger diverse Australian community. These 
range from keen approbation for developing mu-
tually beneficial economic and cultural relations, 
to sharp disapprobation of influence deemed to 
be of concern. 
 
This article has two substantive sections. The 
first looks at the Chinese diaspora in Australia in 
the context of the development of a facilitative 
Multiculturalism Policy. The second looks at di-
aspora and international cultural relations draw-
ing on theoretical frames. It addresses the situa-
tion in Australia (circa 2020) and considers 
whether a resilient diaspora modus operandi is 
available to generate a modus vivendi for the 




1 n.d. no date. 
Chinese Diaspora in Australia  
 
From the 1850s to circa 1950 South Chinese mi-
grating en masse to Southeast Asia were referred 
to as overseas Chinese. Many were hua-gong  
[华工]/Chinese labourers fleeing poverty and 
were significant in the plantation economy era. 
Some merchants and artisans worked abroad and 
brought their families and extended clans to the 
new country, becoming hua-shang [华商]/Chinese 
traders (Wang 1991: 4-10, 21). Up to 1945 they 
mostly saw themselves as hua-ch’iao [华侨]/Chi-
nese sojourners, “who remained politically and 
culturally loyal to China”. Later, from 1950 to 
1980, Chinese migrating “from Hong Kong, Tai-
wan, and Southeast Asia to North America, Aus-
tralia, and western Europe…renounced Chinese 
citizenship and gradually became hua-ren [华 
人]/ethnic Chinese who pledged allegiance to 
their host countries.” Their descendants, foreign-
born Chinese, become huayi [华裔]/Chinese de-
scendants. Post-1980, “xin yimin [新移民]/new 
migrants” dominated overall Chinese emigra-
tion. The “46 million ethnic Chinese who reside 
outside of mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
and Macau in the early 21st century” were called 
“haiwai huaren [海外华人]/Chinese overseas” (Liu 
& Van Dongen 2017). From China’s ‘reform and 
opening-up’ (1980s) and subsequent trade inten-
sification with Australia, new migrants were no 
longer mostly labourers. The contemporary Chi-
nese diaspora includes highly educated profes-
sionals and students, resonating with Arndt’s 
(Op. cit.) definition of cultural relations. Notably, 
as Girard (n.d.)1 reports, “18% of the 25,500 Chi-
nese who acquired permanent resident status in 
Australia from 2011 to 2012 obtained it through 
the investment”. 
 
Mostly skilled, well-educated and globalist, 
‘new migrants’ have come from professional 
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developmental and quality-of-life goals: better 
education, environment, health services, socio-
economic status. They include students-turned 
migrants, professionals and family-uniting or 
chain migrants (Liu 2010: 185). Chinese have a 
“fear of losing” (kiasu[驚輸]) that motivates so-
cial, economic, and academic endeavour and suc-
cess (Special Broadcasting Service). This drive 
has contributed to the development of a vibrant 
Chinese diaspora whose contributions are ap-
plauded by major political party leaders in Aus-
tralia. In 2019, prior to the pandemic, Chinese 
student enrolments were 260,000 plus – 160,000 
in higher education (Hinton 2020). “[T]he influx 
of foreign students is crucial for the Australian 
economy with the injection of AUD 22 billion 
more in 2016-2017, an increase of 18.5% since the 
previous year. In addition, according to various 
Australian political actors such as the Australian 
think tank China Matters, the financial power of 
Chinese students is an important lever of Chinese 
policy in Australia” (Girard n.d.). The following 




Table 1: Chinese migration figures for receiving Australian jurisdictions2  






Australian States  
& Territories  
China-born migra-








portion of total popu-
lation born overseas 
New South Wales 256,100 (303,400) 2,326,400 11% (13%) 
Victoria 176,600 (201,000) 1,892,500 9.3% (10.6%) 
Queensland 51,600 (63,800) 1,140,000 4.5% (5.6%) 
South Australia 26,800 (30,800) 418,800 6.4% (7.4%) 
Western Australia 30,000 (37,000) 895,400 3.4% (4.1%) 
Tasmania 3,300 (3,800) 67,900 4.9% (5.6%) 
Northern Territories 1,400 (1,800) 55,400 2.5% (3.2%) 
Australian Capital  
Territory 
11,900 (13,700) 113,500 10.5% (12.1%) 
Total 557,700 (655,300) 6,909,900 8.1% (9.5%) 




2 Since 2017, China-born migrants are second in number after peo-
ple born in Australia. In 2019, there were 677,000 China-born mi-
grants (2.7% of the population). They are spread across Australia’s 
six states and two territorial jurisdictions with large concentrations 
in two states: New South Wales 256,000; Victoria 176,000; Queens-
land 51,000; Western Australia 30,000; South Australia 26,800; 
Australian Capital Territory 11,900; Tasmania 3,300; Northern Ter-
ritories 1,400. The median age of China-born migrants was 34, on 
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Table 2: Religion and English language proficiency of Chinese in Australia3 





Speaks English only 2.6% 41.9% 90.9% 72.7% 
No religious affiliation 73.4 % 26.7% 33.3% 29.6% 
Buddhism 10.9% 6.5% 1.0% 2.4% 
Catholic, Christian (no 
fixed denomination), 
Baptist 
6.2% 26.3% 28.9% 26.7% 
Source: Adapted from tables in Australian Bureau of Statistics ‘2016 Census QuickStats Country of 
Birth’
 
Chinese cultural organisations in Australia in-
clude the Australian Chinese Community Associ-
ation, Australia China Friendship and Exchange 
Association Inc., Chinese Heritage Association of 
Australia; and Chinese Youth League of Aus-
tralia. There are national (12), and state level 
(New South Wales and Victoria 15 each; Queens-
land 8; South Australia 6; Western Australia 4, 
Tasmania 1) Chinese language media outlets. 
“Chinese-language media, including social me-
dia, have played an increasingly important role 
in domestic politics. As ‘ethnic minority’ media, 
they have been particularly sensitive to multicul-
tural and multiracial policy debates, especially on 
topics that potentially threaten the Chinese com-
munity’s political and economic interests, or 
challenge their cultural values and traditions” 
(Sun 2016). Additionally, Chinese residents have 
access to Chinese news (CGTN - China Global 
TV Network) on cable and satellite television and 
online – so they are well served. Many, particu-
larly students, rely on Chinese rather than west-
ern social media but some use both. 
 
 
3 “The 2016 Census found Australia is home to more than 1.2 million people of Chinese ancestry. Of these, two in five (41 per cent) were 
born in China, with Australia the second most common country of birth (25 per cent) ahead of Malaysia (8.0 per cent) and Hong Kong (6.5 
per cent). Four out of five people of Chinese ancestry (82 per cent) did not state another ancestry. Nearly half of people with Chinese ances-
try (46 per cent) speak Mandarin at home, with the other most common languages being Cantonese (22 per cent) and English (18 per cent). 
Interestingly, more than half of people with Chinese ancestry (54 per cent) reported that they had no religion, significantly higher than the 
overall national figure (30 per cent). One quarter (25 per cent) were Christian, while Buddhism was practised by 15 per cent of people with 
Chinese ancestry. A third (33 per cent) of Buddhists had Chinese ancestry, more than any other ancestral group”. (Australian Bureau of Sta-
tistics 2018).  
 
The Chinese diaspora contributed to the develop-
ment of the mutually beneficial relationship that 
existed between Australia and China until 2019. 
Their contributions have been cultural, economic, 
and social. Chinese cuisine, festivals and lan-
guage have grown in visibility and popularity. 
International cultural relations contributions 
have seeded business. The Chinese diaspora has 
offered entrepreneurship, investment, interna-
tional and domestic trading, demand for hous-
ing, and professionals. Members have also remit-
ted funds to their families in China. The 21st cen-
tury diplomatic spat between Australia and 
China, in which the diaspora has figured, has 
been of concern to members of the community 
who wish to see good relations between their 
countries of origin and adoption/residence. 
 
Overall, the picture of the contemporary Chi-
nese diaspora in Australia is one of a dynamic 
community that enriches the larger society. It 
was demand for labour that brought in tempo-
rary migrants from Asia in the late 1940s to early 
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rationality smoothed the way for dismantling of 
the White Australia Policy. The US South’s ‘seg-
regation’, South African ‘apartheid’ and Aborigi-
nal Australian peoples’ disenfranchisement coex-
isted malodourously with White Australia. The 
Holocaust inspired a new UN human rights re-
gime (late 1940s), Australia playing a leading 
role. Australian Aboriginal peoples were enfran-
chised in 1962 ahead of the US Civil Rights Act 
1964. The Holt Liberal government (1966) re-
moved legal discrimination of migrants based on 
colour or race (National Museum of Australia 
n.d. ‘a’). The Whitlam Labour government re-
placed the Act instituting the White Australia 
Policy with one that banned racial discrimination 
(1975). 
 
An “official model of multiculturalism” that 
included “acceptance of ethno-cultural difference 
and an emphasis upon unity and loyalty to Aus-
tralia” began with a Labour government in 1973. 
It was consolidated under the succeeding Liberal 
government (Moran 2017a). Multiculturalism, a 
policy approach that would shape international 
intercultural relations, commenced. Despite be-
ing variously tweaked, the broad orientation has 
survived. Prime Minister John Howard's Liberal 
government emphasised 'civic duty', 'cultural re-
spect', 'social equity' and 'productive diversity', 
among others, as the foundations for multicul-
tural policies based on the “evolving values of 
Australian democracy and ‘citizenship’” (Nara-
niecki 2013: 254). Prime Minister Kevin Rudd's 
Labour government sought “an increased focus 
on addressing issues of intolerance”; and aimed 
to “empower a local response to issues of racism 
and intolerance” (Koleth 2010). Prime Minister 
Malcolm Turnbull's Liberal government empha-
sised “inviolable individual liberal-democratic 
rights, the privilege of citizenship with expecta-
tions of loyalty and obedience of laws” (Austral-




Diaspora and International Cultural  
Relations – Theory & Suggestions 
 
Policies of sending countries have been summa-
rised in Exploring Diaspora Strategies: An Inter-
national Comparison (Ancien et al. 2009), a re-
port on an Irish workshop. Ireland is a major mi-
grant sender with influential diasporas in the 
United States and Australia. The identified poli-
cies include encouraging and supporting the fol-
lowing: Electoral participation; cultural activities 
and language learning; diaspora social networks; 
information flows and portals; visits to the send-
ing country; advisory services by diaspora lead-
ers. Also included were the seeking of the follow-
ing: advice and training from diaspora profes-
sionals; remittances to families; philanthropy; 
business partnerships and investment; support-
ing business networks; business knowledge net-
works; business mentoring and internships. Ad-
ditionally, rewards would be made to “dias-
poreans who make a significant contribution to 
the homeland”. Receiving countries would look 
for business networks, cultural inputs, invest-
ment, professionals and skilled labour.  
 
Cultural theorists emphasise the cultural con-
sciousness of diasporas (Vertovec & Cohen 1999). 
New features arise when culture travels, interacts 
and mutates. These can be saliences and differ-
ences; compromises and negotiation; conflicts 
and contradictions (Clifford 1992). Diasporas are 
societal ateliers for cultural creativity. When 
communities carry pasts from an erstwhile to a 
new space, novel cultures arise in ‘third spaces’ 
through ‘creolization’. “[P]articipants select par-
ticular elements from incoming or inherited cul-
tures, endow these with meanings different from 
those they possessed in the original cultures, and 
then creatively merge these to create new varie-
ties that supersede the prior forms” (Cohen 2007: 
1). Political and security researchers show how 
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Chinese carry their powerful holistic core cul-
ture when they travel – including the traditional 
concept of civilisation (wenming[文明]) signified 
by dao[道] or ‘the way’. The core Chinese culture 
binds together members of Chinese diasporas 
and communities in China. Chinese diaspora 
members are naturally keen to extend Chinese 
culture. 
 
The core Confucian civic virtue ren yi 
[仁义]/benevolent rectitude is part of dao. The 
Howard Liberal government’s emphasis on 'civic 
duty' (Naraniecki 2013: 254); and the Turnbull 
Liberal government’s emphasis on “liberal-dem-
ocratic rights, the privilege of citizenship with ex-
pectations of loyalty and obedience of laws” 
(Australian Government n.d.: 9). Civic virtue 
prompts for acting on behalf of a country have 
been identified as value-based, rule-based, na-
tionalness-based, expedience-based and combi-
nations thereof (Chitty 2020a; 2017b: 455). 
 
Value-based civic engagement is prompted by 
traditional-moral and secular-rational values; 
Confucianist and globalist respectively. Chinese 
overseas students were at the vanguard of 
China’s encounter with modernity and became 
influentials (Lin 1979). Having embraced eco-
nomic modernity as sojourners in Australia they, 
like many other overseas Chinese, are often keen 
to engage interculturally through negotiating be-
tween Chinese and Australian culture and build-
ing bridges between Australia and China. 
 
Rule-based civic engagement refers to rule-
driven cases such as China’s Social Credit System 
or Australia’s compulsory voting. Both include 
negative sanctions for not engaging in prescribed 
civic behaviour. Unlike in rule-of-law societies, 
China sees rule-by-law as a necessity. Chinese di-
asporas are reactive to changes in China’s 
strength, status and politics. Beijing has expecta-
tions regarding the rights and obligations of 
overseas Chinese that are in some ways not un-
like those from Exploring Diaspora Strategies: An 
International Comparison listed above (Ancien et 
al. 2009). 
 
Nationalness-based civic engagement is based 
on emotional attachment to national culture and 
history. After 1900 many intellectuals and profes-
sionals went abroad to evangelise China’s cause. 
The Japanese invasion of Manchuria (1931) and 
Chinese struggles to restore sovereignty stirred 
up Chinese nationalism. Overseas Chinese who 
had assimilated committed to protecting Chinese 
descendants or re-migrants to facilitate retention 
of ‘Chineseness’. Some of the above features lin-
ger in nationalist feelings in today’s diaspora. 
Another factor is economic nationalism arising 
from China’s new trade-based prosperity. 
 
Expedience-based cultural awareness is trans-
actional and often linked to trade in influence. 
Rewards are reputational and financial. Many 
Chinese scholars have researched the significance 
of overseas Chinese in promoting bilateral trade 
deals and national geopolitical-economic projects 
such as the Belt and Road Initiative – BRI (Li, Xu 
& Chen 2017). BRI includes Foreign Direct Invest-
ment and human resource transactions that the 
Australian State of Victoria has deemed to be 
beneficial. There are mixed opinions about this in 
Australia. Dual-citizenship and dual-national 
identities allow diaspora members to maximise 
their advantage. 
 
Three broad (not mutually exclusive) policy 
responses have been proposed by Australian 
commentators that differently impact diasporic 
international cultural relations. All within a lib-
eral ethos, they are the Great Bridge, Great Wall 
and Great Story prescriptions. (Chitty 2019: 193-
205). 
 
In a Great Bridge approach, Ang (2017: 35-39) 
notes “[t]he mediating role of the Chinese dias-
pora in advancing business and cultural links be-
tween Australia and China [t]hrough their ‘bicul-
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language skills, knowledge of how Chinese busi-
nesses operate and access to co-ethnic transna-
tional networks, they facilitate the entry of Aus-
tralian companies into the Chinese Market”. Sun 
(2019: 22-35) argues that Chinese diasporic media 
in Australia “seems to exist profitably by actively 
giving voice to PRC migrants’ sense of ambiva-
lence towards both Australia and China”. She 
finds that Chinese in Australia are flexible and 
could fall on different sides of Chinese issues. 
She argues therefore members could play a role 
in Australian public diplomacy. Sun’s (2020) “re-
search indicates that when first-generation, Man-
darin-speaking migrants become naturalized citi-
zens, they (1) transition to a political system with 
voting rights and duties; (2) adjust to a different 
civic culture; and (3) shift to a media and digital 
communication environment that features two 
different, even conflicting, political outlooks”. 
 
The Great Wall approach calls for legislation 
against influence that is perceived as clashing 
with Australian democratic values. Growing se-
curity concerns entered the relationship between 
the two countries in 2018, influencing policy en-
vironments relevant to diasporas and diplomatic 
culture. Medcalf (2018) asks “[h]ow do we pro-
tect democratic institutions from foreign interfer-
ence and influence in ways consistent with both 
national interests and national values, such as 
civil liberties, non-discrimination and an inclu-
sive society?” 
 
The Great Story approach (Chitty 2019: 193-
205) is about telling the best stories to captivate 
members of diasporas with stories of the host 
country’s virtues with virtuosity. But it goes be-
yond in that it is about the way in which interna-
tional cultural relations can be conducted sus-
tainably, in order to gain a win-win outcome. 
 
The Great Story approach is about telling 
one’s national cultural stories in diasporic set-
tings within a soft power framework that both 
countries value. There can be both pleasure and 
apprehension when two dissimilar cultures meet. 
Both the pleasure and apprehension of one’s in-
terlocutor needs to be understood in framing a 
story. Over centuries of international dialogue, 
we have learnt how to avoid raising bristles on 
the other side through diplomatic practice – 
within families and communities as well as be-
tween communities, nations and states. Host 
communities and diasporas need to be conscious 
of this modus operandi in their international cul-
tural relations. The notions of friendship and 
hospitality are important here. We propose the 
adoption of a special type of friendship – soft 
power relationship – at every level of interna-
tional cultural relations. In a soft power relation-
ship, members of a larger community that con-
sists of various overlapping diasporas will listen 
to each other; engage in dialogue; exchange val-
ues for mutual benefit; develop mutually benefi-
cial relationships; cooperate in humanist projects 
and eschew violence, coercion, and inducement 
(Chitty 2017a: 24). 
 
As Onuf (n.d.) writes “displacement from 
one’s homeland” demands “a universally war-
ranted response and finding that response in the 
traditional value of hospitality”. He notes that 
Kant briefly remarked “on hospitality as a uni-
versal duty”. Communities need to empatheti-
cally – not just professionally – host sojourners 
(Chitty 2020b). Some members of diasporic com-
munities all over the world experience a sense of 
alienation. Sun (2017: 31-32) has noted that “a 
sense of alienation in the Chinese-speaking com-
munity, including both PRC migrants and Chi-
nese migrants of other origins, is palpable and 
widespread.” This alienation needs to be mapped 
and addressed as an essential condition for suc-
cessful international cultural relations. 
 
Addressing the triangular relationship be-
tween diasporas and sending and receiving 
countries the Chair of the Australian Multicul-
tural Council recognised a time of “growing 
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opportunities to advance Australia’s economic 
prosperity through the strengthening of commu-
nication and partnerships between government 
and diaspora communities in Australia” 
(Ozdowski 2020). For the Chinese diaspora com-
munity, it is wise to take the bridge of cultural 
identities and economic opportunities between 
new and old countries as a locus of civic engage-
ment where social values are projected and pro-
tected. According to Sun’s (2020) research first-
generation Chinese migrants are eager “to learn 
about democratic values, practices and pro-
cesses”; the best way to sustain this “is to pro-
mote social inclusion and encourage fair repre-
sentation” so that those in the Chinese communi-
ties who do not feel they belong, begin to feel 
they do. 
 
Great Story and Golden Rule  
 
How does one straddle alternative cultural deri-
vations of civic virtue? Can there be a successful 
syncretism here? What might be a modus op-
erandi for international cultural relations that 
leads to a modus vivendi for the Chinese dias-
pora in Australia? Which of the three ethics and 
one position identified by Onuf is best applied to 
hospitality in this setting: (1) deontological ethics 
(granting autonomy and requiring treatment “of 
others as ends and not means to an end”; (2) con-
sequentialist ethics (seeking the “greatest good 
for the greatest number”; (3) virtue ethics (that 
“locates the normative thrust of conduct in char-
acter and education, and not in rules, whether 
universal or local”) or the postmodern position 
(focusing on ‘othering’). Deontological and con-
sequentialist are incompatible and subject to 
switching. Therefore, professionalism becomes a 
way of instilling rectitude in behaviour. Virtue 
ethics is Onuf’s preference (Chitty 2020b). The 
first of Chitty’s four civic virtue prompts is vir-
tue-based. Being hospitable to others is a kind of 
civic virtue. Being hospitable could signify im-
bibed virtue, adherence to rules, being inspired 
by nationalness or influenced by a calculus of 
expedience. Virtue-based hospitality will draw 
on the best values of society (Chitty 2020b). Vir-
tuosity in messaging about hospitality and 
friendship requires the infusion of genuine em-
pathy that banishes any sense of alienation. 
 
The hospitality that one would expect of a 
host and a guest is applicable, including in the 
tertiary sector. Students need to feel respected 
and welcomed in any host country, city and insti-
tution. Many host countries, cities and institu-
tions seek ardently to make students feel re-
spected and welcomed. Guests should not be 
subjected to any kind of harassment or disad-
vantage. There are rules against this in many ju-
risdictions. Yet some students continue to not feel 
respected and welcome. Is this an effect of pro-
fessionalisation of hospitality – without there be-
ing empathy? The other side of the hospitality 
coin is that guests should respect the rules of the 
host society (Chitty 2020c). 
 
We have only to look to Habermasian dialogic 
communication to be guided in our communica-
tion as hosts and guests in the tertiary classroom 
and between countries regarding tertiary sector 
issues. John Weir Burton (1965), Australian diplo-
mat and scholar, had already addressed in the 
1960s the need for countries to understand each 
other’s expectations. Countries, institutions, and 
individuals need to find the right formula of vir-
tuosity for their communications with each other. 
 
Chitty (2017a, 23-24; 2015: 1-22) suggests that 
countries should adopt soft power relations as 
defined above. In entertaining civic virtue of dif-
ferent origins that overlap, the commonalities 
should be emphasised. A modus operandi in in-
ternational cultural relations communication and 
conduct should start with making the Golden 
Rule a modus vivendi: Treat others as you would 
like others to treat you. A reciprocal benevolent 
rectitude that governs speech and behaviour, 
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